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Until recently, and especially in the United States, Western Civilization has been dominated by Enlightenment
thought, tempered by the criticisms of the nineteenth century. One of the current questions is whether this
strand of thought is adequate to cope with the problems of the age of anxiety. Those who believe that the
Enlightenment ideas are still basically sound suggest the giving up of transcendent or long-term goals in favor
of more immediate aims. Equality and freedom are, in such a context better when they apply to more people
than when they apply to fewer. According to this way of thinking, one interpretation of justice would be better
than another if it could be realized by more people. That type of security is better which more people can
enjoy. Thus the Enlightenment concepts are dealt with less qualitatively than quantitatively. [excerpt]
Keywords
Contemporary Civilization, Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution
Disciplines
History | Intellectual History | Political History | Social History
Comments
This is a part of Section XIX: An Analysis of the Contemporary World's Search for Meaning. The
Contemporary Civilization page lists all additional sections of Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, as well as
the Table of Contents for both volumes.
More About Contemporary Civilization:
From 1947 through 1969, all first-year Gettysburg College students took a two-semester course called
Contemporary Civilization. The course was developed at President Henry W.A. Hanson’s request with the
goal of “introducing the student to the backgrounds of contemporary social problems through the major
concepts, ideals, hopes and motivations of western culture since the Middle Ages.”
Gettysburg College professors from the history, philosophy, and religion departments developed a textbook
for the course. The first edition, published in 1955, was called An Introduction to Contemporary Civilization and
Its Problems. A second edition, retitled Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, was published in 1958 and 1960.
It is this second edition that we include here. The copy we digitized is from the Gary T. Hawbaker ’66
Collection and the marginalia are his.
Authors
Robert L. Bloom, Basil L. Crapster, Harold L. Dunkelberger, Charles H. Glatfelter, Richard T. Mara, Norman
E. Richardson, and W. Richard Schubart
This book chapter is available at The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/
contemporary_sec19/5
4. Tbe Enlightenment Again Under Attack 
Until and L-^^.por.i ally in -fr.ht^ TTnyj-q.;^. .'nates. Western 
Civilisation has been dominated bv Enl iaiit cmnenttb^'tiriTiF"'' I'titl 
the crrtrcTsins"of the nineteenth centuryT^OnF~oT the current 
qiiestions""is~wEeth'er this strand of thoiight is adequate to cope 
with the problems of the ar;e of amiiety. Those who believe that 
the Enlightenineat ideas are still basically scu.nd sug^ st the 
ii'ivine up of transcendent or lone-tern goals la favor cf Eicro 
iEicediate aims. Equality and freedon are, in such a contest, 
better when they apply to more people than when they apply to 
fewer. According to this way of thinking, one interpretation of 
justice would be bettex- than another if it could be realir^ed by 
i;:ore people. That typo of security is better which noro people 
can enjoy. Thus ._gnlii::htenaent concepts are dealt with less 
qualitatively than - - — 
This approach has certain obvious siorits. It, dees, avoid the 
fin^ine with the iinlichtennGnt demand for an empirical approach to 
all problei£S. And, it includes our traditional GHPhnn-iR nn 
Gupreuacy of the individual., with his rir:ht to pass judginent on all 
icieaio ana values before giving then his allegiance. And finally 
it offers an interpretation which is potentially universal i^i its 
applicability. It can be used to include all ivien on the face of 
the earth, or even oa planets yet to be visited. But, despite 
these advanta.-:ies, this a-prjroach has certain serious shortcoKiinr:s 
when aa.;,}] ind tY/oaJilglk-Xmifcux . 
to_be raised concerning the adequacy 
of the Enlightenraent-liberal tradition today focuses on the dif-
ference between contenporary society and that of the eir:hte5R'gh 
century. In the eax-lier perio3~~Sen^/ere breaking out of a society 
dominated by absolutism and establishing their freedoKi fron its 
restrictions. Biit the Industrial Revolution created a situation 
foi" which the SnlightenEient picture v/as no longer true. Fcr some 
people, such as the I.;ai-;iists, changing econonic conditions neant 
that nan has also lost his political independence. But for others 
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the Enlightenment insistence on man's political and moral 
independence still stood as a bulwark against this interpretation. 
However, the defense of laissez-faire became increasingly hard. 
Man's economic choices, to say nothing about his political and 
moral choices, are just not as free as they once were. 
A -SQ-eead-niie-s-tinn that is raised concerning adogii-npy nf 
the Enlightenment focuses qjo, the earliex, .period' s. chQi-c^"'«^---valiies. 
Critical though it was of ail absolutes, the Enl i p-htpriment 
emphaaizeri values as liberty and equality. Hov/ever, as 
some thinkers have pointed out, these two values are not unrelated 
to the third value of fraternity. Liberty v/ithout fraternity^ 
becomes license; and equality withoTiT''Tra^"ernrtY^ 1 rrq-
sDonsibility.- WhlTe no libeFal wouTS" v/T^h to re to an inter­
pretation which makes freedom and equality depend on fraternity 
(something which would make the individual a mere function of 
the polis, class, nation, or race), he is nevertheless faced with 
his greater interdependence on others today. Re. is forced-^^'to 
recognizetheclaims of the social as well as the individual 
valueig. And his choice is not so much betweeiriblie "individual 
and the social values as it is betv/een the kinds of social values 
which he must choose. 
These claims are todav nf such importance for some people 
that they are demanding a realignment of our vainF- p-tyiinture. 
ThSy ask how we can judge productive efficiency in terms of freedom 
or equality, and evince a sincere desire to have some positive 
standard by means of which the individual can pass a realistic 
judgment on the huge institutions of his time. Such a demand can 
only be countered by referring to the "people" and by saying that 
this is not what the people really want. However, if this is what 
some people sincerely want, there might come a time when a majority 
would wish this, and then we might be faced with a situation in 
which a majority democratically called for undemocratic values to 
be established. Or, we might have a situation in which a majority 
freely voted to deprive themselves of freedom. The most recent 
example of this is to be found in Hitler's continuance in power 
upon the votes of the German people. The very possibility of such 
a situation anyv/here in Western Civilization raises serious 
questions about the purely quantitative approach to values. 
A_J:hird question raised about the quantitative approach con­
cerns its adequacy when making distinctions among valueg. especially 
in such a complex_sqcietx,,..a is .Joda^ Both the Enl i phtanment 
and liberalism shared a noramnn enmity to absolutism in all it.a fn-rmH, 
and, as a consequence, a common program: the promotion of fx.aedom. 
As long as"this was a major objective, it was possible to think 
mainly in terms of the extent of a single value. Liberalism meant 
more freedom for more people in an increasing number of areas of 
life; religion, politics, economics, and culture in general. But 
today, when the critical v/ork has largely been done, and the con­
struction of a new type of society is well under v/ay, man is faced 
\?ith a choice. Is liberty more important than security? Is politics 
more important than economics? Is efficiency more important than 
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individuality? Is ethics more important than economics, or than 
politics? To answer these questions, a purely numerical approach 
breaks down. How can we settle these questions in terms of the 
number of people who would be free and the number who would be 
secure? Some other type of standard is demanded, one which will 
enable us to put our several values in order of priority and then 
decide among them, 
A fourth nuestion follows hard upon the heels of this last 
one. ^~Tt i§__P£L-Qe.w auction. bujtlxllSi'r one..^mtoch>Jaaa»Jj^ea^^ 
e^7gT'~~sTnca-ltbtj)• Is it 
po^i HT^ t.n aT-T"ivP> n,t an i riptal and tl33 sense of obligation which 
approacft? The Enlig1iiu»^mfHT4?--4-r>«4 s;tpd that t.bp only way msju-cou 1 d 
irnow that any^-hi-iag^.^ua.g.--dfa^iT-ahiroag fyriTO tliT fnct that thry fiifl 
desire it. Any other approach seemed to them to be nothing more 
than a return to some form of absolutism. Kant's criticism that 
it v/as impossible to arrive at an ought by piling up any number of 
ises went to the heart of this question. His shifting of the 
basis of attack from the problem of knowing to that of acting 
opened up the new lines which we have been following. But the 
chain of events which followed Kant, represented by men such as 
Hegel and Bismarck, only served to substantiate the Enlightenraent 
belief that any way other than its own represented a return to 
absolutism. More recently, however, students of history and politics 
have raised the question whether the matter is as uncomplicated 
as a simple choice betv/een freedom and authority. They have pointed 
out, as did Burke, that the French Revolution, v/hich follov/ed the 
ideas of the Enlightenment, became just as authoritarian as any 
other political movement. These tnore rprr-nt. nnnlxses ham-SnggoRtcd 
that man, ajUga-ygj had some ought or standard of obligation above 
iTis empirical existence, that thR Knl i p-htennen^. picture of man as 
completely free to choose among v'arious r ivnr. nnT-oai i c!ti <?, 
^nd ' tiie question, at least nov/, is not v^heiJifij:, or not to have-ajay 
i d e a l s ,  | 5 T r r " f 5 i T r F i p r ~ w K T r t i .  
This need •Fy'' wnmp n-f tp anH 
bfi in numlnir nf nrnaTi nf h-min PYlst.ennfi o-f +hp 
most sigiTiT-,n-ir.n- innp-n^|TA, thought • and grammar, If, for 
example, we wish to make a comparative statement, the—niilas__Q£ 
g;rammar force c>inpl r»y a reference to something whi r.h i w j t... 
self not rp-laJiijup-• If v/e wish to say that something is more (big­
ger, faster), we are required to say more than something else. Our 
English teachers insist that when we compare we must compare one 
thing v/ith something else. So we say: He is taller than she, or 
he is taller than he was a year ago. We find the same problem 
when we try to graph the path of a planet. Axes must be set up to 
give us the frame of reference within which we can draw a line 
which will have meaning. Even when v/e set up a scientific experi­
ment we must have a point of reference as our control. This helps 
explain why some thinkers are trying to construct a language of 
words or mathematical symbols in v/hich such static references will 
no longer be necessary. But, for the present time at least, v/e 
seem to be faced with the need for some standard in order to vinder-
XIX p. IS 
stand our experiences, whether they be scientific or social, and 
to express the results of those experiences meaningfully in terms 
acceptable to the demands of thought and grammar. 
Thorft 1!^ n"e final problem which has appeared recently among 
pr.yr.hn1 nglatsB... and--4m4-rby4a|iQlQgists~ Th¥~psycSolbgists have for 
some time agreaxi...that.^ .a person enl^Srygr: araamifc personaliiy 
If he tries J;^1-_£q11ow a consist eat value system which Itn^daa^ a 
riAf i ni te p-ri n-ri ty AntJirQPQlogists have discovej^ed that the same 
thing hQXd£LJu:uia.._Jtor---3ghole cultures, even thpugK" cuIT:ufeg~may 
diiier™X-ad±caLly„amoixg„-tJiemiSjelYes,» And this means that the more 
closely knit ourjQulture becomes^ the better it will be if it has 
a~"yaTug^^^ and further, that tHe happier we w^^ if we can 
find Itj, But, if valufis.-.liajze.^iux reali.tv. or refir to no reality, 
then serious probXems-ane raised. The moral problem has been 
raised by those sociologists who ask how an anthropologist can 
disbelieve in the reality of values, while at the same time either 
recognizing the need fpr them if a culture is to be intelligible 
or recommending them to a culture for its improvement. A meta­
physical problem appears when we ask how it is that such nonreal 
values can work so well, or why a culture's refusal to accept them 
brings disastrous results. 
The demand that we make mir cultural values absolute in order 
to defend them~~againsT~^e powersI-Q^totaIitariaxL-r.niTnl:ri ea 
,a1rgxnst~The yery grain of pur_ Enligh^ejmaalL.The demand 
that we conform appaa-vR as nothing fin as t-h^ .imry denial of 
p^asT history. Faced with the events of Worl^ Eax-1, th^-poXi^Eiuial 
defeats of democracy, and the wnri dwi depT'eHsinrL^-iJie liberals * 
faith was' deejilv-^aiiaken. tfriSeF the 3m;^ of these events many" of 
them turned to a socialistic interpretation of liberalism by means 
of which they hoped to harness and control the economic forces. 
For many, especially during the depression years of the thirties, 
Russia ^became the great example of this sort of socialism. But 
the Iloimgression Pact of 1939 between Russia and Nazi Germany 
brought such an interpretation of Communism to an end, as the 
purges of 1936-1937 had brought to an end the interpretation of 
Communism as a democratic movement. The Spanish Revolution of 
1936-1939 appeared to many to be simply another Enlightenment 
situation in which free men were rising up against old feudal 
absolutisms. But the liberals who joined the Republican forces 
soon found themselves the supporters of Communism against the 
fascist-backed forces of Spanish conservatism, FinaHx., the 
ou tbre a^jo f_WQjridJa3®---tf "i n 1939^ seemed to -for^e^ouce-^.agaiii„jtlie 
cOiiirrasion that the contempQraxy ,world represented- sot 
as aJjaaEi]^^ power, between the great nation-states. The 
que"stion was now how tg .aruwaiieseIf against:..SHch J.nstitutions. 
